TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=89TT0433> <link 93TG0022> <link 93TG0021> <link 93TG0020> <link 89TT1491> <title> Feb. 13, 1989: More Reason For Hope Than Fear </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1989 Feb. 13, 1989 James Baker:The Velvet Hammer </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> WORLD, Page 46 More Reason for Hope Than Fear </hdr><body> Though the U.S. loses a diplomatic edge as the Soviets and Chinese grow closer, Washington still has much to gain from the new detente By Cyrus Vance and Richard C. Holbrooke If all goes well, the year's most spectacular photo opportunity will present itself in May, when Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping meet in Beijing. But this will be much more than a photo-op. Such a summit would formally end an important advantage enjoyed by the U.S. since Richard Nixon visited China in 1972: Washington could talk to the leadership in both Beijing and Moscow, but there was no high-level dialogue between the Soviets and the Chinese and virtually no significant contact at lower levels. Being able to speak to two sides while they cannot seriously talk to each other is a tremendous plus in diplomacy. At times some Washington officials sought to overplay "the China card," but the Chinese had a keen sense of how far to let things go. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter established full diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing, putting the relationship on a permanent, rather than personal, basis. The Nixon-Carter policies, ultimately endorsed by President Reagan, had at least three major consequences. First, the Chinese were drawn into constructive interaction with the other nations along the Pacific Rim, thus ending a long period in which the Chinese were regarded as dangerously destabilizing. Second, America's strategic position, widely assumed to be imperiled by the disastrous ending of its involvement in the Viet Nam War, was unexpectedly enhanced. Finally, the new relationship between China, the United States and Japan dealt a diplomatic setback to the Soviet Union throughout the region. Nonetheless, the United States should not fear the ending of its monopoly of Big Three summit dialogue. Sino-American relations are now firmly based on mutual interests that go far beyond a common attitude toward Moscow. Gorbachev and Deng will not emerge from a summit ideologically reunified or recommitted to joint support of subversion. In the Third World, Marxism has lost its attractiveness as an ideology and an economic theory; men calling themselves Marxists openly discuss what they can learn from capitalist societies like South Korea. However, even as the socialist economies liberalize, the fundamental disagreements still exist between our democratic principles and the Communist system. Gorbachev and Deng have the ability to reduce tensions significantly in Asia. Two legacies of the past should be at the top of their agenda. In both cases the U.S. can play an important role. The Korean peninsula. For 20 years, Moscow and Beijing have vied for the position of First Friend to North Korea -- each trying to outdo the other in supporting its tyrannical leader, Kim Il Sung, 76. The result has been that North Korea has been under little or no pressure to moderate its attitude toward South Korea. Given Kim Il Sung's desire to unify Korea under his own brutal leadership, progress may be impossible until he passes from the scene. But even Kim, a pure Stalinist, has shown a willingness to open more lines of communication with Seoul, and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo himself predicts a North-South summit soon. The less the Soviet Union and China are forced, by their rivalry, to support Kim's outdated myths, the more rapidly both countries can develop valuable economic and political ties with South Korea. Kampuchea. This is the most critical area in which Deng and Gorbachev could make a contribution to peace. Since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea a decade ago drove the Khmer Rouge into enclaves along the border with Thailand, the country has lived in a shadow world, no longer terrorized by Pol Pot and his gang of murderers but still under foreign occupation, with fighting continuing along the borders. Moscow and Beijing picked sides a long time ago. The Soviets backed Hanoi and the pro-Vietnamese faction in Phnom Penh, headed by Hun Sen, while China supported the Khmer Rouge. Primarily for cosmetic reasons, even the Chinese finally abandoned Pol Pot publicly, while continuing to support his army. Frenetic diplomatic activity is now under way in at least half a dozen capitals. In the wings, waiting to play yet another dramatic scene on center stage, is Prince Sihanouk. Despite his mercurial behavior, Sihanouk continues to personify his nation-state to his own people and the world. He is essential to any settlement. All this is encouraging, but a settlement in Kampuchea requires the support of both Moscow and Beijing. The original reasons for the Sino-Soviet rivalry in what was then termed Cambodia have been overtaken by post-1970 internal changes in the Soviet Union and China. If Moscow and Beijing agree to use their influence to force both sides to deal with Sihanouk, then a settlement becomes possible, given the great dependence of all Kampuchean factions on outsiders. But there is a great danger: the Khmer Rouge must not be given an opportunity to return to power in Kampuchea. Lately much has been made of the idea that certain "senior leaders" of the Khmer Rouge, including Pol Pot, must leave. But there is also a distinct possibility, as Sihanouk himself has indicated, that the Khmer Rouge might be permitted to retain a separate military organization. And in addition, Khieu Samphan, the head of the faction, would be allowed to participate in a coalition government. The U.S. must oppose these concessions. Khieu Samphan is as much an international outlaw as Pol Pot. If the Khmer Rouge is permitted to remain armed, it would constitute an enormous danger to Kampuchea. Given a chance, once the Vietnamese are gone, the men of the killing fields would undoubtedly seek full power again by whatever means available. The U.S. must play an active role if such a tragedy is to be averted. It should not encourage or appear to sponsor any settlement that allows the Khmer Rouge to return to Phnom Penh as an organization inside a coalition. American policy under Carter and Reagan restored Washington's influence in Asia and established a relatively stable balance of power among the four major players in the Pacific: the U.S., China, Japan and the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev truly wishes to make the Soviet Union a participant in the region's "economic miracle," as he has repeatedly said, he should accept that balance of power as well as the American naval presence, which is an important component of that stability. Much would still remain to be done, notably resolving the dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over several small islands in the Kurile chain, what the Japanese call the Northern Territories, which have been controlled by the U.S.S.R. since World War II. The Soviets should also open their far east much more fully to foreign trade and visitors, and operate their own Pacific fleet in a way that does not raise concern over Soviet objectives. With one leader nearing the end of his historic era and the other encumbered by domestic problems, there is some uncertainty about the permanence of what Deng and Gorbachev decide. But in foreign policy, these two men still talk with the greatest authority. They have it in their power not only to end formally a long period of hostility but also to make an enormous contribution to peace. It may be too early to hail a new era in Asia. But the good news is that an event that would have caused waves of concern from New Delhi to Washington only a few years ago will unfold this year in Beijing with much more reason for hope than fear. </body></article> </text>